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THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF ACCRETION: A NEW
ELEMENT IN PROPERTY LAW
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have made fed-
eral law in-roads into what has been traditionally considered the
exclusive province of state law, the rules governing real property.'
Significant among these, especially in view of its potential effect on
land titles in Louisiana, is Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona.2 The Court's
approach to the question of ownership of accreted lands requires an
understanding of the foundation of a state's rights to the beds of
navigable waters as well as an examination of traditional common
law rules of accretion.
Common Law Rights in Water Bottoms
Early in the history of English law there developed the general
rule that the kind of water flowing over the land, either tidal or non-
tidal, was the crucial factor in determining property rights in the
land.' At least by the time of Elizabeth I the notion had emerged that
the Crown held dominion over land under tidal waters, while the
public rights to navigation in these waters had been recognized well
before that time.' The tidal-non-tidal distinction was not carried
over to the colonies because the geography of our country greatly
diminished the utility of that dichotomy.' Instead the more relevant
concept of navigability was substituted for the English emphasis on
tidal waters and thus ownership by the sovereign became linked to
navigability.' The revolution brought sovereignty to the peoples of
the various states and the accompanying right to the soil beneath
navigable waters.7 Though the states through the Constitution sur-
1. See Sachse, United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.-A Choice of Law,
34 LA. L. REv. 29 (1973).
2. 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
3. Lord Hale, De Jure Maris in MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FoRESHORE, 376-80 (3d
ed. 188) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]. The Crown's dominion extends "as far as the
reach of the tide, around the coasts of the kingdom," Hall, Essay on the Rights of the
Crown in the Seashore, in MooRE 669.
4. Fraser, Title to the Soil under Public Waters-A Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L.
REV. 313, 327 (1918) [hereinafter cited as Fraser].
5. "[Njavigable waters, not affected by the ebb and flow of the tide, such as the
great lakes and the Mississippi River, were unknown to courts and jurists, when the
rules of the common law were ordained." St. Paul & Pac. R. Co. v. Schurmeier, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 272, 288 (1869).
6. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892).
7. Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74 (1855); Den v. Jersey Co., 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 426 (1853).
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rendered the ultimate control over navigation to the federal govern-
ment,8 "the shores of navigable waters and the soils under the same
in the original states were not granted by the Constitution to the
United States but were reserved to the several states."9
Several theories have been advanced to explain the retention of
these lands by the sovereign. One is that the notion of the sovereign's
dominion grew out of the judicial practice of strictly construing
grants by the sovereign against the recipient. The rationale for this
rule is that a liberal construction of grants by the sovereign would
unduly diminish "the prerogatives and rights and emoluments of the
Crown being conferred upon it for great purposes, and for the public
use."' 10 The necessary consequence of applying this rule to grants of
land bordering waterbodies of tremendous public utility was the
tendency to view the grant as stopping at the water-line, with control
of the waters remaining with the sovereign. This process culminated
in England with the emergence of the concept that dominion over all
tidal waters and the soil beneath them resides in the sovereign."
American courts, though sometimes viewing this issue as but a mat-
ter of construction, have more often seen larger implications in their
rulings that title to the beds of navigable waters vests in the sover-
eign. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Shively v.
Bowlby,'13 which despite its vintage remains the fullest explication of
the law governing water bottoms, explains that:
Such waters, and the land they cover ... are incapable of ordi-
nary and private occupation, cultivation and improvement; and
their natural and primary purposes are public in their nature, for
highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and
for the purpose of fishing. .... 1
Some commentators have expressed skepticism at the claim that
public use requires state ownership,' 5 and indeed, private ownership
8. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
9. Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867).
10. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 10 (1894), quoting Sir Wm. Scott in The
Rebeckah, 165 Eng. Rep. 158, 159 (1799); See also III KENT'S COMMENTARIES 432 (2d
ed. 1832).
11. Fraser 327.
12. Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65 (1926); St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Schurmeier, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272, 288 (1868).
13. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
14. Id. at 11. "They are of great value to the public for the purposes of commerce,
navigation and fishery. Their improvement by individuals, when permitted, is inciden-
tal or subordinate to the public use and right. Therefore the title and control of them
are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people." Id. at 57.
15. See, e.g., A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 32 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE
91 (1966).
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of the beds of navigable waters has been approved by the United
States Supreme Court. " Nevertheless, the prevailing view remains
that the "natural and primary" uses of waterways require that owner-
ship of the soil beneath them be vested in the public. 7
The justification for state ownership also operates to impose lim-
itations upon the state's title. Soil below navigable waters is held
"not only subject to, but in some sense in trust for, the enjoyment of
certain public rights."'" Admission of new states on an equal footing
with the original thirteen served not only to give title to soil beneath
navigable waters to the newly created sovereigns,'9 but also required
that such title be subject to the enjoyment of public rights.2 0 The
leading exposition of the public trust imposed upon a state's title is
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Illinois Central Rail-
road Co. v. Illinois," where the validity of a legislative grant of lands
below the highwater mark in Lake Michigan was at issue. After a
lengthy review of the doctrine of public trust leading to the observa-
tion that the state's title is "held in trust for the people of the state
that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have the liberty of fishing therein free from the ob-
struction or interference of private parties,"" the Court concluded
that under the circumstances the grant created an unreasonable in-
terference with public uses and therefore was invalid as beyond the
16. See, e.g., Appleby v. New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
17. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (1892); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); see Comment, 30 TuL.
L. REV. 115 (1955).'
18. Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74 (1855).
19. Admission to the Union has given the new states the same "rights, sovereignty
and jurisdiction . . . as the original states possessed within their respective borders."
Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867). Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212, 228-29 (1845); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 93 (1857). Often
the act admitting the new state declared that its admission was on an equal footing
with the original states. For example, 2 Stats. 641 (Feb. 20, 1811) proposes that Louis-
iana "shall be admitted into the Union, upon the same footing with the original
states." This doctrine has been construed to accord the new states certain rights in
the soil beneath navigable waters. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
20. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs., 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 69 (1873). "General language sometimes found in the opinions of
the courts, expressive of absolute ownership and control by the state of lands under
navigable waters, irrespective of any trust as to their use and disposition, must be read
and construed with references to the special facts of the particular cases." Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). In Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, the
courts speaks of "the limited nature of a sovereign's rights in the riverbed." 414 U.S.
at 328.
21. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
22. Id. at 452.
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legislature's competence.23 Even when a grant of the bed of navigable
waters to an individual has been upheld, the grantee's title is bur-
dened with the duty of non-interference with the primary public pur-
poses of commerce, navigation and the like. 4
Traditionally, the doctrine of public trust has been limited to
protection of navigation, commerce and fishing upon navigable wa-
ters. 2 But as early as the last century recognition was growing of other
public interests which were likewise deemed worthy of special protec-
tion. The Minnesota supreme court in 18932 looked to various eco-
nomic, recreational and other purposes when it sought to give the
term navigable a "sufficiently extended meaning to preserve and
protect the rights of the people to all beneficial public uses217 of
certain inland lakes. More recent enumerations of important public
interests in waters have been equally expansive. For instance, when
the California supreme court examined the public interest in lands
between low and high tide lines in Marks v. Whitney,2 it found that
preservation of the natural ecological balance was to be considered
along with established recreation uses as a public interest worthy of
special protection.
Federal interests in navigable waterways, though derived from
the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce,2 ' have
also been expanded beyond traditional notions of either commerce or
navigation. In Zabel v. Tabb2 ° the question before the Fifth Circuit
was whether the Secretary of the Army could consider conservation
when determining if a permit for construction required by the Rivers
23. "Such abdication (of the State's control over lands beneath navigable waters)
is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the government of the
state to preserve such waters for the use of the public." Id. at 453. Lands one mile out
from the shore had been granted in fee to the railroad, the total area being in excess
of one thousand acres. The railroad constructed wharves, piers and docks upon these
lands.
24. "[I]mprovement by individuals [of lands beneath navigable waters] when
permitted is incidental or subordinate to the public use and right." Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873); Marks
v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 379, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 795 (1971): "[Tlhe
buyer of land under these statutes receives the title to the soil, the jus privatum,
subject to the public right of navigation, and in subordination to the right of the state
to take possession and use and improve it for that purpose, as it may deem necessary."
25. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
26. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
27. Id. at 199, 53 N.W. at 1143.
28. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
29. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
30. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
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and Harbors Act3 should be issued. Turning to the national policy
favoring environmental conservation,"2 the court refused to require
that the Secretary "wear navigational blinders"33 and held his consid-
eration of conservation proper. Even more inclusive is the Code of
Federal Regulations' listing of factors that the Secretary should con-
sider when assessing an application for construction in navigable wa-
ters. The effects of the project on fish and wildlife, conservation,
pollution, aesthetics and ecology are included among the factors he
must evaluate in reaching his decision. 4
Common Law Doctrines of Accretion, Reliction and Avulsion
The equal footing doctrine granted to newly created states the
same sovereignty and jurisdiction over territory within their borders,
including navigable waterways, that the original states possessed,
"subject to the common law."35 The Submerged Lands Act of 195336
confirmed the "title to and ownership of lands beneath navigable
waters within the boundaries of the respective states"37 but allowed
in this quitclaim3 8 for modification of these lands by erosion, accre-
tion and reliction3 9
Accretion, or alluvion, has been defined as an "addition to ri-
parian land, gradually and imperceptibly made by the water to which
land is contiguous"; 0 more technically, it is an addition made by the
31. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1953).
32. "[T]he government-wide policy of environmental conservation is spectacu-
larly revealed in at least two statutes, the Fish and Wildlife Co-ordination Act [16
U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1934)] and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [42
U.S.C. §§ 4331-47]." Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 209 (5th Cir. 1970).
33. Id. at 208.
34. "All factors which may be relevant to the proposal must be considered; among
these are conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, historic
values, fish and wildlife values, flood damage protection, land use classifications,
navigation, recreation, water supply, water quality and, in general, the needs and
welfare of the people." 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(f) (1974).
35. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228 (1845).
36. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1953).
37. Id. § 1311(a).
38. "The Act is not a grant of title to land but only a quitclaim of federal proprie-
tary rights in the beds of navigable waterways." Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S.
313, 324 (1973).
39. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1953): "(a) The term 'lands beneath navigable waters'
means-
(1) all lands within the boundaries of each of the respective States which are
covered by nontidal waters that were navigable . ..up to the ordinary high water
mark as heretofore or hereafter modified by accretion, erosion, and reliction .
40. County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 68 (1874).
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deposit of solid material by the water." Erosion is the opposite pro-
cess, whereby water removes soils. Reliction, which brings into play
the same rules as accretion," is the uncovering of land by the gradual
recession of water. 43
Common law courts have considered it to be a universal rule 44
that accretion belongs to the owner of the land to which it attaches.
Similarly title to relicted land passes to the owner of the adjacent
shore. 41 If the boundary of a tract is the waterline, the shifting of the
waterline operates to shift the landowner's boundary, causing him to
gain in area if the processes of accretion or reliction have occurred and
to lose if there has been erosion or overflow.4 At common law no
distinction appears to be made as to the type of waterbody involved,
with these rules applying alike to rivers, lakes and the sea. 47 Nor do
the causes of the various changes usually alter application of these
rules,48 even when the activities of persons (other than the landowner
claiming the accretions) cause or hasten the build-up of land.41
41. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.26 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited
as CASNER]; cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 509.
42. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); Jones v. Johnston, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 150, 156 (1855); cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 510. Reliction is often called accretion
by the courts, but no harm results because of the similar legal treatment accorded both
processes.
43. CASNER § 15.26; cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 510.
44. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 35 (1893) (a rule "everywhere admitted");
Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57, 67 (1864) (adhered to, by "[a]lmost all jurists
and legislators . . . ancient and modern"). The Civil law is usually seen as the source
of the common law rules of accretion. See 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 261-62
[hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE] ("the imperial law"); J. ANGELL, LAW OF
WATERCOURSES 52-53 (6th ed. 1869).
45. See note 43 supra.
46. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); Hughes v. Washington, 389
U.S. 290 (1967); Jefferies v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178 (1890); County of St.
Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874); Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.)
57 (1864); Jones v. Johnston, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 150 (1855); New Orleans v. United
States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836).
47. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (ocean); Jefferies v. East Omaha
Land Co., 134 U.S. 178 (1890) (river); Jones v. Johnston, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 150 (1855)
(lake). The Louisiana laws which do not correspond to the usual rules of accretion with
regard to land bordering the sea or lakes appear to be unique in this area. See LA. Civ.
CODE art. 510 (the sea); Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1937); State
v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931) (lakes); CASNER § 15.33.
48. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 370 (1892) where the court rejects
the argument that normal rules on accretion should not apply to land along the Mis-
souri river because of the peculiar character of the river.
49. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); County of St. Clair v.
Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874); see Annot. 134 A.L.R. 467 (1941); 6 R.
POWELL, PROPERTY § 984 (1969).
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In County of St. Clair v. Lovingston,5 the United States Su-
preme Court offered both the doctrine of accessions5 and the maxim
"Qui sentit onus debet sentire commodum"52 as the basis for the
landowner's right to future alluvion which it characterized as a vested
right. Though often criticized, "3 it is this second notion-that the
riparian owner has an aleatory contract with nature-that courts
most often see as the legal foundation for the rules governing accre-
tion.55 Blackstone, while recognizing that the rules put the landowner
in the position of a wagerer, justified them as an application of "de
minimis non curat lex." 55 Although the processes may result in the
addition of rather large areas, it is usually required that there be a
gradual increasing of land if the rule which states that accretion
belongs to the owners of the adjacent land is to apply,57 and it is in
this sense that Blackstone speaks of "de minimis."
Several other rationales for the accretion rules have been ad-
vanced by courts and commentators.58 One is the theory of productiv-
ity, the inverse of the basis for finding ownership of water bottoms
in the public. When accreted land attaches to a riparian's holding,
he is considered to be in a better position than either the state or a
stranger to exploit it. 5 It is land no longer "incapable of ordinary and
private occupation, cultivation and improvement. . . ."10 Perhaps
more persuasive is the claim that since riparianness is an important
50. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874).
51. "It is the same with that of the owner of a tree to its fruits .... Id. at 69. In
Note, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 315 (1972) (referred to as "a perceptive discussion" by the Court
in Bonelli), the author states that this rationale for the rules of accretion comes from
Roman law. The articles of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with accretions are found
in the chapter on the right of accession (Bk. II, tit. 1, ch. 3).
52. The person who bears the burden should receive the advantage. 90 U.S. (23
Wall.) at 69 (trans. supplied).
53. See, e.g., 4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1219 (3d ed. 1939). The author states
that the notion (riparian owner should receive the benefit because he takes the risk of
loss) assumes the matter at issue.
54. This is often labeled the compensation theory. See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co. v.
Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973); Note, 14 Amz. L. REV. 315, 323 (1972).
55. See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973); County of
St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874); Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.)
57 (1864); New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1834).
56. BLACKSTONE 262.
57. Id. at 261; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893); Jefferies v. East Omaha Land
Co., 134 U.S. 178 (1890); County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46
(1874); Jones v. Johnston, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 150, 156 (1855) ("if the same be by little
and little").
58. See Note, 14 ARIz. L. REv. 314, 322-24 (1972), where the author examines six
reasons that have been advanced for these rules.
59. Id. at 323.
60. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1893); see text at note 14 supra.
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asset, a landowner should not be deprived of it because of the water's
movement. 1 Access to the water and the other rights that flow from
a land's riparian character, often the "most valuable feature"6 of the
land, would be subject to the frequently whimsical movement of riv-
ers and streams if the established rules governing accretions and
relictions were not applied. Corollary to this argument is the belief
that if the water-line is a boundary of a tract, it should remain so
despite its movement. 3
That the riparian quality of a tract may be its most valuable
feature has not been deemed sufficient reason, however, to apply the
usual rules of accretion when a change is classified as an avulsive
one.64 Avulsion, the sudden change of a stream's banks either by
abandoning its channel for a newly created one or by the washing
away from one bank and depositing on another a considerable quant-
ity of soil,5 does not result in a change in boundary." Rather, title to
soil thus affected remains in the former owner.6 7 Though attempts
have been made to explain why the quality of being riparian is a
consideration when the change is accretive, but not when it is avul-
sive,1" the legal distinction between these processes indicates that
either the de minimis reasoning or the wager analogy is the true
foundation for the rule of accretion.
The Bonelli Decision
In settling disputes involving rights in real property, state law
usually governs." Federal courts hearing diversity cases, even in the
days before Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, ° looked to applicable
state law for their rules of decision in matters involving real prop-
61. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973).
62. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 293 (1967).
63. "[Wlhere lands are bounded by water, it may well be regarded as the expect-
ancy of the riparian owners that they should continue to be so bounded." Bonelli Cattle
Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973); Jefferies v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S.
178 (1890); 6 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 983 (4th ed. 1969).
64. For an example of the different results that would flow from an avulsive
change, and the evidence to be considered in making the classification, see Mississippi
v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 302 (1974).
65. CASNER § 15.26.
66. Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23 (1904).
67. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); Philadelphia Co. v. Stim-
son, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); BLACKSTONE 261.
68. See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 327 (1973).
69. "Surely it must be conceded as a general proposition that the law of real
property is, under our Constitution, left to the individual States to develop and admin-
ister." Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
70. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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erty.7' Nor has the fact that a litigant's interest was traceable to a
federal grant usually allowed for a shift to federal law.72 In Joy v. St.
Louis,7 3 the United States Supreme Court refused to find federal
question jurisdiction when the plaintiff, whose title derived from a
federal patent, brought an action in ejectment for accretion along his
land. Ownership of the accreted land, said the Court, was "a question
of local or state law, and not one of a Federal nature."74
At various times, however, the United States Supreme Court has
disregarded state property rules and viewed certain property ques-
tions as requiring resolution according to federal law. In Borax Ltd.
v. Los Angeles,7" for example, the extent of land conveyed by a post-
statehood federal patent was considered a question of federal law,
since it "concern[s] the validity and effect of an act done by the
United States. . .. "" This decision provided the basis for the
Court's later holding in Hughes v. Washington" that ownership of
accretions to ocean-front property, conveyed to the plaintiff's ances-
tor in title by a pre-statehood federal patent, was governed by federal
rather than state law.
It was on the basis of Hughes that the petitioner in Bonelli Cattle
Co. v. Arizona,"5 seeking to overturn the adverse ruling of the Arizona
supreme court,79 urged that federal law govern his claim to land aban-
71. In Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) the Court excluded from the realm
of federal common law "rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such
as the rights and titles to real estate .. " Id. at 18.
72. "The constitution, for example, empowers Congress 'to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting ... Property belonging to the United
States.' Grants pursuant to the exercise of this power are the foundation of a large
portion of the land titles in the country. Conceivably, Congress might have attempted
to impose conditions on these grants governing the rights and powers of grantees and
subsequent holders. But as the Supreme Court has read the legislation it provided
instead that the interests of the grantees should be assimilated into the general mass
of property interests in the state, and subject thereafter to the governance of the
general land law of the states." Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 526 (1954).
73. 201 U.S. 332 (1906).
74. Id. at 342. See also Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
75. 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
76. Id. at 22. The issue of navigability, which is determinative of whether owner-
ship of lands beneath inland waters rests with the state has also been considered a
federal question. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
77. 389 U.S. 290 (1967). The Court found the invocation of federal law to be
further supported by the fact that the case involved "the vital interest of the nation
in its boundaries." Id. at 293.
78. 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
79. State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 489 P.2d 699 (1971), supplemental
opinion, 108 Ariz. 258, 495 P.2d 1312 (1972).
COMMENTS
doned by the stream of the Colorado River. A pre-statehood federal
patent had conveyed a parcel of land along the river to the Santa Fe
Railroad, part of which land was later conveyed to Bonelli. Uncer-
tainty as to whether the Bonelli portion of the land was riparian at
the time of the federal patent was an obstacle to applying Hughes."
But the holding of the Arizona supreme court that the equal-footing
doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act extended the state's owner-
ship to include the contested land8 enabled the United States Su-
preme Court to find another basis for choosing federal law, conclud-
ing:
The very question to be decided is the nature and extent of the
title to the bed of a navigable stream held by the State under the
equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act. In this
case, the question of title as between the State and a private
landowner necessarily depends on a . . . 'right asserted under
federal law.' 2
The United States Supreme Court found no objection to the
Arizona court's construction of the equal-footing doctrine as giving
the state title to land newly submerged by the movement of the river.
"[U]nder federal law, the State succeeds to title in the bed of the
river to its new high-water mark."83 The parting of ways came in
determining the effect that the withdrawal of waters, due to a federal
rechannelization project, had upon the state's title. The state court,
applying state law to determine ownership, viewed the change as
avulsive and therefore not divesting the state of its title. 4 The United
States Supreme Court reversed and found that under federal com-
mon law the exposed land was not due to avulsion, but was a "grad-
ual and imperceptible accumulation of land on a navigable river-
bank, by way of alluvion or reliction."85 Since Arizona made no show-
ing that the accreted land was "related to furthering the navigational
or related public interests," 8 the Court declared that the land be-
longed to the riparian owner.
The unique factual context which gave rise to the decision in
Bonelli could furnish a basis for its limitation.87 The movement of the
80. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 321 n.11 (1973).
81. State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 468, 489 P.2d 699, 702 (1971),
supplemental opinion, 108 Ariz. 258, 259, 495 P.2d 1312, 1313 (1972).
82. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 320-21 (1973).
83. Id. at 318.
84. State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 469, 471, 489 P.2d 699, 701, 703.
85. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 325 (1973).
86. Id. at 329 (1973).
87. Fashioning of federal common law has usually occurred when the Court has
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Colorado River was influenced by the federal government's operation
of Hoover Dam and the rechannelization project had been under-
taken by the Bureau of Reclamation. Basic notions of fairness also
pushed very strongly for a decision in favor of Bonelli, for even with
the Court's award of the relicted land, the Bonelli tract still did not
equal its former size. Nonetheless, the significance of Bonelli lies in
the Court's treatment of the broader issues concerning the federal
common law of accretion and the effect it has upon a state's rights
under the equal-footing doctrine.
Bonelli magnifies the importance of two legal concepts of ancient
origin: the doctrine of public trust and the rule that accretion belongs
to the riparian. The decision makes it clear that the law of accretion
is not to be disregarded in determining a state's interest in soil pres-
ently or formerly beneath navigable waters,8 at least in those states
whose interests can be traced to the equal-footing doctrine.89 But
language in the opinion also indicates that the doctrine of the public
trust, which lies at the base of the equal-footing grant to the states,
conditions any state interest in these lands and may serve to vary
whatever rights a state would obtain by application of the rules of
accretion. 0 Though the Court in Bonelli found specifically that appli-
cation of the rules of accretion was most appropriate to the facts of
found "an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision," Illinois
v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972) or "a significant conflict between some
federal policy or interest and the use of state law in the premises." Wallis v. Pan
American Petrol. Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966). In Bonelli, federal government activity
greatly influenced the waters movement. Since the awesome federal power over naviga-
ble waters may sometimes impose a heavy burden on riparians perhaps the Court was
trying to interject some requirement of fairness into the overall scheme by allowing the
riparian to gain when the government's exercise of its servitude worked in his favor.
414 U.S. 313, 329-31. See also Bartke, The Navigational Servitudes and Just Compen-
sation-Struggling for a Doctrine, 48 ORE. L. REV. 1 (1968).
88. "But federal law must be applied with a view towards the limited nature of
the sovereign's rights in the riverbed, and an analysis of the interests of the State and
Bonelli, in light of the rationales for the federal common-law doctrines of accretion and
avulsion .... " 414 U.S. at 328.
89. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 336 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
90. "There has been no showing that the rechannelization project was undertaken
to give the state title to the subject lands for the protection of navigation or related
public goals." 414 U.S. at 323. "[W]here land cast up in the Federal Government's
exercise of the servitude is not related to furthering the navigational or related public
interests, the accretion doctrine should provide a disposition of the land as between
the riparian owner and the state." Id. at 329. "But there is no claim here by the state
that depriving Bonelli of the subject land is necessary to any navigational or related
purpose." Id. at 331. See also Id. at 323 n.15.
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the case,9' and concluded that the state had no right to the disputed
property on the basis of those rules, it nevertheless went on to classify
Arizona's attempted acquisition of the exposed land as "a windfall,
since [it was] unnecessary to the state's purpose in holding title to
the beds of navigable streams within its borders." 2 The implication
is that if retention by the state of the exposed lands is necessary to
the furthering of "navigational and related public goals,"93 the Court
will not resort to a mechanical application of the rules of accretion.
Public Trust and Accreted Lands
Any effort to enumerate everything that might be included in the
category of "related public goals" in connection with accreted land
would certainly prove futile. This should not be surprising since it is
presently impossible to define the exact parameters of the state's
much longer established interest in navigation. 4 However, decisions
by several state courts holding that a state's public trust obligations
with respect to navigable waters do not stop at the water's edge
provide some inkling of the scope of the doctrine in this area. In Just
v. Marinette County,95 where the issue was the validity of a shore-
land zoning ordinance, the court stated that "lands adjacent to or
near navigable waters exist in a special relationship to the state...
and are subject to the public trust powers. . . ."" Those powers
included, in the court's opinion, the protection of fishing, recreation
and scenic beauty. The Mississippi supreme court also recently con-
sidered the state's public trust obligations and held that the legisla-
ture had no authority to convey for private purposes marshlands and
accreted land. 7 Though the accreted land obviously no longer served
primarily navigational purposes, the court felt that the "changing
circumstances of the land did not displace the trust imposed upon the
91. Id. at 329. Certainly there will be situations where the reason for the rules on
accretion will not justify their applications. The build-up of land may be so large or
so swift that de minimis would be inappropriate. While the aleatory contract analogy
fits in the case of a meandering river or stream, in a lake into which a sediment-laden
stream flows the odds are overwhelmingly in favor of build-up. See R. GRESSWELL, THE
PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF RIVERS AND VALLEYS, 64-69, 103-05 (1962); RUSSELL, RIVER AND
DELTA MORPHOLOGY, 36-37 (1967).
92. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 328 (1973).
93. See note 90 supra.
94. "The extent of the State's interests should not be narrowly construed because
it is denominated a navigational purpose." Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313,
323 n.15 (1973).
95. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
96. Id. at 18-19, 201 N.W.2d at 769.
97. International Paper Co. v. Mississippi State Hwy. Dept., 271 So. 2d 395 (Miss.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
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state for the public.""8 Similarly the California supreme court was
unwilling in the Marks" case to find an automatic termination of the
public trust when tidelands were reclaimed.
The leading commentator on the public trust doctrine has seen
its basis in three important interests of society, 00 which interests
could be found to affect the disposition of accreted lands. Society's
interest in certain public rights, such as navigation and fishing, is
paramount because general access to these rights is implied in the
concept of citizenship. The second interest is in preserving for the
public in general those things "so particularly the gifts of nature's
bounty."'1' Lastly, the private use of certain resources has been con-
sidered inappropriate, because of the peculiarly public nature of
these resources. It is not difficult to envision numerous situations
when any or all of these interests may be found to affect land
bordering navigable waters.' Certainly any of the various uses that
courts have included within the public trust in navigable waters
could conceivably be included in a public trust burdening accreted
lands, and thus constitute a reason for retention of title by the
state.8 3 Even if the land were found to be no longer "incapable of
98. 271 So. 2d at 399.
99. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
100. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 484-85 (1970).
101. Id. at 484.
102. See the Congressional findings that preface the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64, which provide in part:
(a) "There is a national interest in the effective management, beneficial use, protec-
tion, and development of the coastal zone;
(b) The coastal zone is rich in a variety of natural, commercial, recreational, industrial,
and esthetic resources of immediate and potential value to the present and future well-
being of the Nation;
(c) The increasing and competing demands upon the lands and waters of our coastal
zone occasioned by population growth and economic development, including require-
ments for industry, commerce, residential development, recreation, extraction of min-
eral resources and fossil fuels, transportation and navigation, waste disposal, and
harvesting of fish, shellfish, and other living marine resources, have resulted in the loss
of living marine resources, wildlife, nutrient-rich areas, permanent and adverse
changes to ecological systems, decreasing open space for public use, and shoreline
erosion ...
(e) Important ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic values in the coastal zone
which are essential to the well-being of all citizens are being irretrievably damaged or
lost ......
103. In 1965 Wisconsin enacted a Water Resources Act, Wis. LAWS ch. 614 (1965),
that required local governments to enact shoreland zoning. The stated purpose of the
act was "to further the maintenance of safe and healthful conditions; prevent and
control water pollution; protect spawning grounds, fish and aquatic life; control build-
ing sites, placement of structure and land uses and reserve shore cover and natural
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ordinary cultivation," it might nevertheless be best suited for, and
best serve the public by some extraordinary use for which the state
alone possesses the necessary resources.
Conclusion
The Court's opinion in Bonelli invites a balancing of the interests
that support application of the normal rules of accretion with those
that support retention of state ownership of contested land, burdened
by a continued and perhaps expanded public trust. When the weight
is in favor of state control, especially if there is a legislative or admin-
istrative scheme'04 for dealing with the lands in a manner consistent
with public trust uses, the rules of accretion should give way. Just as
American courts discarded the distinction between lands under tidal
and non-tidal waters because the geographical makeup of our country
indicated an expanding public interest, so should the courts approach
the problem of ownership of accreted lands with a flexibility appre-
ciative of the growing public interest in lands along navigable waters.
James J. Walsh
beauty." Wood, Wisconsin's Requirements for Shoreland and Flood Plain Protection,
10 NAT. RES. J. 327 (1970). One authority has doubted whether there can be any type
of satisfactory waterfront utilization, especially along lakes which are more ecologically
delicate than streams, without public ownership. Id. at 327, 330, 333. This contention
would seem to greatly aid any argument that the state should retain title to accreted
lands.
104. See, e.g., La. Acts 1974 No. 587 amending LA. R.S. 38:2352, 2356-57 (1972)
which deal with the Atchafalaya basin. The Coastal Zone Management Act authorizes
federal funding of state programs to manage coastal zones. See 16 U.S.C. § 1454
(1972).
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